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Abstract
Twokindsofintegritymeasures—contaminationandsuppression—areintroduced.
Contamination measures how much untrusted information reaches trusted outputs; it
is the dual of information-ﬂow conﬁdentiality. Suppression measures how much in-
formation is lost from outputs; it does not have a conﬁdentiality dual. Two forms
of suppression are considered: programs and channels. Program suppression mea-
sures how much information about the correct output of a program is lost because
of attacker inﬂuence and implementation errors. Channel suppression measures how
much information about inputs to a noisy channel is missing from channel outputs.
The relationship between quantitative integrity, conﬁdentiality, and database privacy
is examined.
1 Introduction
Many integrity requirements for computer systems are qualitative, but quantitative require-
ments can also be valuable. For example, a system might combine data from trusted and
untrusted sensors if the untrusted sensors cannot corrupt the result too much. As another
example, we might add noise to a database, thereby protecting privacy, if the resulting
anonymized database still contains enough uncorrupted information to be useful for statis-
tical analysis. Yet methods for quantiﬁcation of corruption—that is, damage to integrity—
have received little attention to date, whereas quantiﬁcation of information leakage has been
a topic of research for over twenty years [17,31].
To quantify corruption, a formal deﬁnition of “integrity” is required. We know of no
such widely accepted deﬁnition, although the widely accepted informal deﬁnition seems to
be “prevention of unauthorized modiﬁcation of information” [10,13,14,21,34,46]. So we
take two distinct notions of information modiﬁcation as points of departure: taint analysis
and program correctness. These lead to two distinct measures of corruption that we name
“contamination” and “suppression.”
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ﬂow from tainted inputs to outputs that are supposed to be untainted—or, using alterna-
tive terminology, from untrusted inputs to outputs that are supposed to be trusted. This
ﬂow results in contamination of the trusted outputs. Trusted outputs are not supposed to
be inﬂuenced by untrusted information, so contamination corrupts integrity. We might be
willing to deem a program secure if it allows only limited contamination, even though taint
analysis would deem the same program to be insecure. So quantiﬁcation of contamination
would be useful.
Flow between untrusted and trusted objects was ﬁrst studied by Biba [4], who identi-
ﬁed a duality between models of integrity and conﬁdentiality. The conﬁdentiality dual to
contamination is leakage, which is information ﬂow from secret inputs to public outputs.
Previous work has developed measures of leakage based on information theory [8] and on
beliefs [12]. This paper adapts those measures to contamination.1 Through the Biba duality,
we obtain a measure for corruption from a measure for leakage.
Suppression, our other measure for corruption, is derived from program correctness.
For a given input, a correct implementation should produce an output o permitted by a
speciﬁcation. The output might be permitted to differ from o provided the output conveys
the same information as o. An implementation might, for example, produce all the bits in
the binary representation of o but in reverse order. Or the implementation might produce
o xor k, where k is a known constant. Any knowledgeable user of these implementations
could recover o from the implementation’s output.
Conversely, the output of an incorrect implementation would fail to convey all the infor-
mation about o. For example, a (somewhat) incorrect implementation might output only the
ﬁrst few bits of o; or it might output o with probability p and output garbage with probabil-
ity 1 p; or it might output o xor u, where u is an untrusted input. In each case, we say that
program suppression of information about the correct output has occurred. Implementation
outputs are not supposed to omit information about correct outputs, so program suppression
corrupts integrity. Yet we might be willing to use an implementation that produces sufﬁcient
information about the correct output, hence exhibits little program suppression, even though
a traditional veriﬁcation methodology (e.g., Hoare logic) would deem the implementation
to be incorrect. So quantiﬁcation of program suppression would be useful.
The echo speciﬁcation “o := t” gives rise to an important form of program suppression
that we call channel suppression. The echo speciﬁcation stipulates that a correct output o
is the value of input t, similar to the Unix echo command. For the echo speciﬁcation, our
model of program suppression simpliﬁes to the information-theoretic model of communica-
tion channels [43], in which a message is sent through a noisy channel. The receiver cannot
observe the sender’s inputs or the noise but must attempt to determine what message was
sent. Sometimes the receiver cannot recover the message or recovers an incorrect message.
For example, a noisy channel could be modeled by implementation “o := t xor u”, in
which noise supplied by the attacker in untrusted input u causes information about correct
1Newsome et al. [35] adapt the same information-theoretic metric to measure what they call quantitative
inﬂuence (cf. §6).
2output t to be lost. The channel thus damages the integrity of information.
With programs and channels, suppression occurs when information is lost. This paper
shows how to use information theory to quantify suppression, including how to quantify the
attacker’s inﬂuence on suppression. We start with channel suppression. Then we general-
ize to program suppression, giving both information-theoretic and belief-based deﬁnitions.
Applying the Biba duality to these deﬁnitions yields no meaningful conﬁdentiality dual. So
the classical duality of conﬁdentiality and integrity was, in retrospect, incomplete.
We might suspect that contamination generalizes suppression, or vice versa, but this is
not the case. Consider the following three program statements, which take t as trusted input
and u as untrusted input, and produce o as trusted output. Suppose that these statements are
potential implementations of echo speciﬁcation “o := t”:
• o := (t;u), where (t;u) denotes the pair whose components are t and u. This pro-
gram exhibits (only) contamination, because trusted output contains information de-
rived from untrusted input. A user of this program’s output might ﬁlter out and ig-
nore contaminant u, but that’s irrelevant: the contaminant damages integrity just by
its presence, as in taint analysis. Contamination is concerned only with measuring
the amount of contaminant in the output—not what the user does with the output.
This program does not exhibit program suppression, because its output contains all
the information about the value of t.
• o := t xor n, where n is randomly generated noise. This program exhibits (only)
program suppression, because information about the correct output is lost. Suppres-
sion concerns that loss; suppression is not concerned with the presence of contami-
nant. In fact, this program cannot exhibit contamination, because it has no untrusted
inputs.
• o := t xor u. This program exhibits contamination, because untrusted information
affects trusted output. This program also exhibits program suppression, because the
noise of u causes information about the correct output to be lost.
So although contamination and suppression both are kinds of corruption, they are distinct
phenomena.
In addition to introducing measures for corruption, this paper examines the relationship
between the information-theoretic and belief-based approaches to quantifying information
ﬂow. We show that, for individual executions of a program, the belief-based deﬁnition is
equivalent to an information-theoretic deﬁnition. And we show that, in expectation over all
executions, thebelief-baseddeﬁnitionisanaturalgeneralizationofaninformation-theoretic
deﬁnition.
Finally, we revisit work on database privacy. Databases that contain information about
individuals are sometimes anonymized and published to enable statistical analysis. The
goal is to protect the privacy of individuals, while still providing useful data for analysis.
Mechanisms for anonymization suppress information—that is, integrity is sacriﬁced for
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Figure 1: Contamination model
conﬁdentiality. Using our measure for channel suppression along with a measure for leak-
age, we are able to make this intuition precise and to analyze database privacy conditions
from the literature.
We proceed as follows. Models for quantifying contamination and suppression are
given in §2 and §3. Belief-based deﬁnitions and their relationship to information-theoretic
deﬁnitions are examined in §4. Database privacy is analyzed in §5. Related work is dis-
cussed in §6, and §7 concludes. All proofs appear in appendix A. Basic notions from
information theory (e.g., entropy and mutual information) are used throughout the paper;
appendix B provides these deﬁnitions.
2 Quantiﬁcation of Contamination
Three agents are involved in our model of program execution: a system, a user, and an at-
tacker.2 The system executes the program, which has variables categorized as input, output,
or internal. Input variables may only be read by the program, output variables may only
be written by the program, and internal variables may be read and written but may never
be observed by any agent except the system itself. The user and the attacker supply inputs
by writing the initial values of input variables. These agents receive outputs by reading the
ﬁnal values of output variables. The attacker is untrusted, whereas the user is trusted.
Our goal is to quantify the information about untrusted inputs that contaminates trusted
outputs. Thisgoalgeneralizestaintanalysis, whichjustdetermineswhetheranyinformation
about untrusted inputs contaminates trusted outputs. We accomplish our goal by quantify-
ing the information the user learns about untrusted inputs by observing trusted inputs and
outputs:
Deﬁnition: Contamination is the amount of information a user learns about untrusted in-
puts by observing trusted inputs and outputs.
Our use of terms “learning” and “observation” might suggest quantiﬁcation of conﬁdential-
ity. The resemblance is deliberate, because we seek a deﬁnition of integrity that is dual to
conﬁdentiality. In particular, our approach is dual to the technique of Clark et al. [8,9] for
quantifying leakage.3
2Although we phrase our theory in terms of programs, other notions of computation could be used. All we
require is that there are inputs, outputs, and a way to derive output distributions from input distributions.
3Hence, readers familiar with that work will be unsurprised by our ﬁnal deﬁnition of expected contamina-
tion in equation (2.6), and perhaps unsurprised by the development leading up to it. But we present the full
4The deﬁnition of contamination engenders two restrictions on the user’s access to vari-
ables. First, the user may not directly read untrusted inputs. Otherwise, we would be quan-
tifying something trivial—the amount of information the user learns about untrusted inputs
by observing untrusted inputs. Second, the user may not read untrusted outputs, because
we are interested only in the information the user learns from trusted outputs. In addition to
these restrictions, we do not allow the user to write untrusted inputs. So the user may access
only the trusted variables. Similarly, the attacker may access only the untrusted variables.4
These access restrictions agree with the Biba integrity model [4]: they prohibit reading up
(the user cannot read untrusted information) and writing down (the attacker cannot write
trusted information). The resulting communication model for contamination is depicted in
ﬁgure 1.
2.1 Contamination in Single Executions
Information theory explains the behavior of channels. A channel, like a program, accepts
inputs and produces outputs. So information ﬂow can be quantiﬁed by modeling a program
as a channel and using information theory to derive the amount of information transmitted
over the channel.
A channel’s inputs are characterized by a probability distribution of individual input
events. Channels might be noisy and introduce randomness into output events, so a chan-
nel’s outputs are also characterized by a probability distribution. Let tin, uin, and tout
denote trusted input, untrusted input, and trusted output events. (Each event may com-
prise the values of several input or output variables.) Also let Tin, Uin, and Tout denote
probability distributions on trusted inputs, untrusted inputs, and trusted outputs.5
Mutual information characterizes the quantity of information that can be learned about
channel inputs by observing outputs. Let I(uin;tout) denote the mutual information be-
tween events uin and tout—that is, the amount of information either event conveys about
the other.6 Note that I(;) is mutual information between single events, not the more fa-
miliar mutual information between distributions of events. Let I(uin;tout jtin) denote the
mutual information between events uin and tout, conditioned on the occurrence of event
tin.7
The quantity C1 of contamination of trusted outputs by untrusted inputs in a single
development because it illuminates each step through the lens of integrity (rather than conﬁdentiality), thus
increasing conﬁdence in our deﬁnitions. It also makes this paper self-contained.
4Flows from trusted to untrusted need not be prohibited. So the attacker could be allowed to read trusted
inputs or outputs, and the user could be allowed to write untrusted inputs. But for simplicity, we don’t consider
those ﬂows in this paper.
5Distribution Tout could be deﬁned in terms of Tin, Uin, and some representation of the channel—for
example, if the channel is represented as a probabilistic program, the denotational semantics of that program
describes how to calculate Tout [24].
6ThedeﬁnitionofmutualinformationI(;)isgiveninequation(B.5). Somereadersmightbemorefamiliar
with I(;) as a notation for mutual information. We use a comma, rather than a semi-colon, to emphasize that
the notation is symmetric.
7Conditional mutual information I(;j) is deﬁned in equation (B.7).
5execution, given the trusted inputs, is deﬁned as follows:
C1 , I(uin;tout jtin): (2.1)
(The subscript 1 is a mnemonic for “single.”)
Consider the following program:
oT := iU xor jT (2.2)
Suppose that variables oT, iU, and jT are one-bit trusted output, untrusted input, and trusted
input, respectively, and that the values of iU and jT are chosen uniformly at random. In-
tuitively, the user should be able to infer the value of iU by observing jT and oT, hence
there is 1 bit of contamination. And according to deﬁnition (2.1) of C1, the quantity of
contamination caused by program (2.2) is indeed 1 bit. For example, the calculation of
I(iU = 0;oT = 1jjT = 1) proceeds as follows:
I(iU = 0;oT = 1jjT = 1) =  log
Pr(iU = 0jjT = 1)Pr(oT = 1jjT = 1)
Pr(iU = 0;oT = 1jjT = 1)
=  log
(1=2)(1=2)
1=2
= 1:
And calculating I(iU = a;oT = bjjT = c) for any a, b, and c such that b = a xor c would
yield the same contamination of 1 bit. If b 6= a xor c, then the calculation would yield
an undeﬁned quantity because of division by zero. This result is sensible, because such a
relationship among a, b, and c is impossible with program (2.2).
2.2 Contamination in Sequences of Executions
Given C1, which provides a means to quantify contamination for single executions, we can
quantify the contamination over a sequence of single executions. As an example, consider
the following program, where operator & denotes bitwise AND:
oT := iU &jT (2.3)
Suppose that the attacker chooses a value for untrusted input iU and that the user is allowed
to execute the program multiple times. The user chooses a potentially new value for trusted
input jT in each execution, but the single value for iU is used throughout. Also, suppose
that all variables are k bits and that iU is chosen uniformly at random. Intuitively, the
contamination from this program in a single execution is the number of bits of jT that are
set to 1. Thus, a user that supplies 0x0001 for jT learns8 the least signiﬁcant bit of iU
(so there is 1 bit of contamination); 0x0011 yields the two least signiﬁcant bits (2 bits of
8Recall that contamination is the amount of information a user learns about untrusted input by observing
trusted input and output.
6contamination), etc. But if a user executes the program twice, supplying ﬁrst 0x0001 then
0x0011, the user learns a total of only 2 bits, not 3 (= 1 + 2). Directly summing C1 for
each execution provides only an inexact upper bound on the contamination.
To calculate the exact amount of contamination for a sequence of executions, note the
following. The untrusted input is chosen randomly at the beginning of the sequence. Each
successive execution enables the user to reﬁne knowledge of that untrusted input. So each
successive calculation of contamination should use an updated distribution of untrusted
inputs, embodying the user’s reﬁned knowledge about the particular untrusted input chosen
at the beginning of the sequence.9 Let Uj be a random variable representing the user’s
accumulated knowledge in execution j about the untrusted input event, and let t
j
out and t
j
in
be the trusted input and output events in that execution. The distribution of Uj+1 is deﬁned
in terms of the distribution of Uj:
Pr(Uj+1 = uin) = Pr(Uj = uin jt
j
out;t
j
in): (2.4)
So the updated distribution is obtained simply by conditioning on the trusted input and
output. This conditioning is repeated after each execution.
We thus obtain the following formula for the total contamination ~ C in a sequence of
executions:
~ C =
X
j
I(u
j
in;t
j
out jt
j
in);
where u
j
in is the untrusted input event in execution j, and mutual information I() is calcu-
lated according to distribution Uj on untrusted inputs.
Returning to program (2.3), initial distribution U1 on iU is uniform. But distribution U2,
obtained by supplying 0x0001 as the ﬁrst input, is uniform over iU that have the same least
signiﬁcant bit as jT. Thus, the user learns only 1 bit by supplying 0x0011 in the second
execution. The total contamination according to ~ C is exactly 2 bits for the sequence—which
is what our intuition suggested.
2.3 Contamination in Expectation
C1 quantiﬁes contamination in a single execution. It could be used at runtime by an execu-
tion monitor [41] to constrain how much contamination occurs during program execution.
We might, however, be interested in how much contamination occurs on average over all
executions of a program—a quantity that might be conservatively bounded by a static anal-
ysis. We now turn our attention to that quantity.
The expected quantity C of contamination of trusted outputs by untrusted inputs, given
the trusted inputs, is the expected value of C1:
C = E[C1]: (2.5)
9Readers familiar with the use of beliefs in quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow will recognize this distribution
as representing a belief; we discuss this matter further in §4.
7The right-hand side of equation (2.5) can be rewritten as the mutual information I(Uin;
Tout jTin) between distributions Uin and Tout, conditioned on observation of Tin. That
yields our deﬁnition of expected contamination:10
C , I(Uin;Tout jTin): (2.6)
Deﬁnition (2.6) of C yields an operational interpretation of contamination. In infor-
mation theory, the capacity of a channel is the maximum quantity of information, over all
distributions of inputs, that the channel can transmit. Shannon [43] proved that channel ca-
pacity enjoys an operational interpretation in terms of coding theory: a channel’s capacity
is the highest rate, in bits per channel use, at which information can be sent over the channel
with arbitrarily low probability of error. Therefore, the maximum quantity of contamina-
tion should also be the highest rate at which the attacker can contaminate the user. We leave
investigation of this interpretation as future work.
2.4 Leakage
Clark et al. [8,9] deﬁne quantity L of leakage from secret inputs Sin to public outputs Pout,
given public inputs Pin, as follows:
L , I(Sin;Pout jPin): (2.7)
Replacing “untrusted” with “secret” and “trusted” with “public” in equation (2.6) yields
equation (2.7). Contamination and leakage are therefore information-ﬂow duals: their def-
initions are the same, except the ordering of security levels is reversed. For example, the
deﬁnition of C conditions on Tin, which represents inputs provided by a user with a high
security level (because the user is cleared to provide trusted inputs); whereas the deﬁnition
of leakage conditions on Pin, which represents inputs provided by a user with a low security
level (because the user is not cleared to read secret inputs). So Biba’s qualitative duality for
conﬁdentiality and integrity [4] extends to these quantitative models.
3 Quantiﬁcation of Suppression
3.1 Channel Suppression
To quantify channel suppression, we reﬁne our model of program execution by replacing
the user with two agents, a sender and receiver. The receiver, by observing the program’s
outputs, attempts to determine the inputs provided by the sender. The program models a
channelinwhichinputsaremessages, andthereceiverattemptstodeterminewhatmessages
were sent. For example, the sender might be a database, and the program might construct a
web page using queries to the database; the receiver attempts to reconstruct information in
the database from the incomplete information in the web page. Information that cannot be
reconstructed has been suppressed.
10Mutual information I(;j) is deﬁned in equation (B.8). The equality of equations (2.5) and (2.6) follows
from the deﬁnitions of C1 (2.1) and I (B.8).
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Figure 2: Channel suppression model
Deﬁnition: Channel suppression is the amount of information a receiver fails to learn about
trusted inputs by observing trusted outputs.
As with contamination, the program receives trusted inputs as the initial values of vari-
ablesandproducestrustedoutputsastheﬁnalvaluesofvariables. Butnowthesenderwrites
the initial values of trusted inputs, and the receiver reads the ﬁnal values of trusted outputs.
These are the only ways that the sender and receiver may access variables. We continue
to model an attacker, who attempts to interfere with trusted outputs by writing the initial
values of untrusted inputs. For simplicity, the attacker is not allowed to read trusted inputs
or outputs. This communication model for channel suppression is depicted in ﬁgure 2.
We ﬁrst deﬁne channel suppression for single executions. As in our model of con-
tamination, let tin and tout be trusted input and trusted output events. Since I(tin;tout)
is the quantity of information obtained about trusted inputs by observing trusted outputs,
I(tin;tout) is the quantity CT1 of channel transmission from the sender to the receiver in a
single execution:
CT1 , I(tin;tout): (3.1)
Let I(tinjtout) denote the information conveyed by the occurrence of event tin, conditioned
on observation of the occurrence of tout.11 Using equation (B.3), we can rewrite the right-
hand side of equation (3.1):
CT1 = I(tin)   I(tinjtout): (3.2)
Quantity I(tin) is the total information that the receiver could learn about the trusted input,
and I(tinjtout) is what remains to be learned after the receiver observes the trusted output.
So I(tinjtout) is the quantity of information that failed to be transmitted.12 Therefore,
I(tinjtout) is the quantity CS1 of channel suppression in a single execution:
CS1 , I(tinjtout): (3.3)
Although untrusted input uin does not directly appear in equations (3.1) or (3.3), they
do not ignore the attacker’s inﬂuence on channel suppression: trusted output tout, which
does appear, can depend on uin. Also, recall that the deﬁnition (2.1) of contamination C1
11Conditional information I(j) is deﬁned in equation (B.2).
12Alternatively, the right-hand side of equation (3.1) could be rewritten with equation (B.4) as I(tout)  
I(toutjtin). Perhaps this formula could also yield a measure for integrity, were we interested in backwards
execution of programs—that is, computing inputs from outputs.
9conditions on uin; equations (3.1) and (3.3) do not because the receiver cannot directly
observe untrusted input—unlike the user, who could in the contamination model.
We next deﬁne channel suppression in expectation. Let I(Tin;Tout) denote the mutual
information between distributions Tin and Tout, and let H(TinjTout) denote the entropy
of distribution Tin, conditioned on observation of Tout.13 (As before, Tin and Tout are
probability distributions on trusted inputs and trusted outputs.) By taking the expectation
of CT1 and CS1, we obtain the expected quantities of channel transmission CT and channel
suppression CS:14
CT , I(Tin;Tout); (3.4)
CS , H(TinjTout): (3.5)
These deﬁnitions account for the attacker’s inﬂuence on channel transmission and channel
suppression, because distribution Tout depends on the attacker’s distribution Uin on un-
trusted inputs. Also, these deﬁnitions should yield an operational interpretation in terms of
coding theory; we leave that interpretation as future work.15
As an example, consider the following program:
oT := iT xor rnd(1) (3.6)
Variables iT and oT are one-bit trusted input and output variables. Program expression
rnd(x) returns x uniformly random bits. Suppose that trusted input distribution Tin is
uniform on f0;1g. Then channel transmission CT is 0 bits and channel suppression CS is
1 bit. These quantities are intuitively sensible: because of the bit of random noise added by
the program, the receiver cannot learn anything about iT by observing oT.
Similarly, consider the following program:
oT := iT xor jU (3.7)
Variable jU is a one-bit untrusted input. Suppose that untrusted input distribution Uin is
uniform. Then program (3.7) exhibits the same behavior as program (3.6): 0 bits of channel
transmission and 1 bit of channel suppression. Because of the bit of random noise added by
the attacker, the receiver cannot learn anything about iT by observing oT.
Programs (3.6) and (3.7) both cause 1 bit of channel suppression, but the source of that
channel suppression is different. For program (3.6), the source is program randomness;
for program (3.7), it is the attacker. We develop deﬁnitions that distinguish between these
sources, next.
13Mutual information I(;) and conditional entropy H(j) are deﬁned in equations (B.6) and (B.10).
14Equation (3.4) follows directly from equations (3.1) and (B.6). Similarly, equation (3.5) follows from (3.3)
and (B.10). Note that expected channel suppression CS is deﬁned using entropy H, not using mutual infor-
mation I, even though channel suppression CS1 is deﬁned using self-information I. This notational quirk is
inherited from information theory and occurs because entropy—not mutual information—is the expectation of
self-information (cf. footnote 31).
15The basis of that interpretation would be the capacity of the channel from trusted inputs to trusted outputs
(cf. §2.3).
10Attacker-controlled channel suppression. Let CSP denote the quantity of channel sup-
pression attributable solely to the program—that is, the quantity that would occur if the
attacker’s input were known to the receiver:
CSP , H(Tin jTout;Uin): (3.8)
Thisdeﬁnitiondiffersfromdeﬁnition(3.5)ofchannelsuppressionCS onlybytheadditional
conditioning on Uin, which has the effect of accounting for the attacker’s untrusted inputs.
Any remaining channel suppression must come solely from the program.
Deﬁne the quantity of channel suppression CSA under the attacker’s control as the dif-
ference between the maximum amount of channel suppression caused by the attacker’s
choice of Uin and the minimum (which need not be 0 because of channel suppression at-
tributable solely to the program):
CSA , max
Uin
(CS)   min
Uin
(CS): (3.9)
(CS is a function of Tout, which is a function of Uin, so quantifying over Uin is sensible.)
For program (3.6), quantity CSP of program-controlled channel suppression is 1 bit,
and quantity CSA of attacker-controlled channel suppression is 0 bits. The converse holds
for program (3.7), which exhibits 0 bits of program-controlled channel suppression and 1
bit of attacker-controlled channel suppression.
The following program exhibits both attacker- and program-controlled channel suppres-
sion:
o2T := i2T xor i2U xor rnd(1) (3.10)
All variables in program (3.10) are two-bit. One bit of program-controlled channel suppres-
sion CSP is caused by the xor with rnd(1). But the attacker controls the rest of the channel
suppression. If the attacker chooses i2U uniformly at random, the channel suppression is
maximized and equal to 2 bits; whereas if the attacker makes i2U a constant (e.g., always
“00”), the channel suppression is the minimal 1 bit caused by rnd(1). Calculating CSA
yields 1 (= 2   1) bit of attacker-controlled channel suppression.
Error-correcting codes. An error-correcting code adds redundant information to a mes-
sage so that information loss can be detected and corrected. One of the simplest error-
correcting codes is the repetition code Rn [1], which adds redundancy by repeating a mes-
sage n times to form a code-word. For example, R3 would encode message 1 as code-word
111. The code-word is sent over a noisy channel, which might corrupt the code-word;
the receiver reads this possibly corrupted word from the channel. For example, the sender
might send code-word 111, yet the receiver could receive word 101. To decode the received
word, the receiver can employ nearest-neighbor decoding: the nearest neighbor of a word
w is a code-word c that is closest to w by the Hamming distance. (The nearest neighbor is
not necessarily unique for some codes, in which case an arbitrary nearest neighbor is cho-
sen.) Treating words as vectors, Hamming distance d(w;x) between words w and x is the
11number of positions i at which wi 6= xi. For the repetition code, nearest-neighbor decoding
means that a word is decoded to the symbol that occurs most frequently in the word. For
example, word 101 would be decoded to code-word 111, thus to message 1; but word 001
would be decoded to message 0.
Consider the following program BSC, which models the binary symmetric channel stud-
ied in information theory:
BSC : w := m xor rndp(n)
Variable m, which contains a message, is an n-bit trusted input, and variable w, which con-
tains a word, is an n-bit trusted output. Expression rndp(x), in which p is a constant, returns
x independent, random bits. Each bit is distributed such that 0 occurs with probability p and
1 occurs with probability 1 p. (So rnd(x), used in program (3.6), abbreviates rnd0:5(x).)
Thus, each bit of input m has probability 1   p of being ﬂipped in output w.
Suppose that n = 1 and that the distribution of trusted input m is uniform. Then the
probability that BSC outputs w such that w = m holds is p. So quantity CS1 of channel
suppression is  logp. Next, suppose that the sender and receiver employ repetition code
R3 with program BSC. The sender encodes a one-bit input m into three bits and provides
those as input to BSC (so now n = 3). The receiver gets a three-bit output and decodes it to
bit w. Denote this composed program as R3(BSC). The probability that w = m holds is now
p3 + 3p2(1   p), which can be derived by a simple argument.16 The amount of channel
suppression CS1 is thus  log(p3 + 3p2(1   p)), which is less than  logp for any p > 1
2.
So for any p > 1
2 (i.e., for any channel at least slightly biased toward correct trans-
mission) the channel suppression from R3(BSC) is less than the channel suppression from
BSC. We conclude that repetition code R3 improves channel transmission. Although this
conclusion is unsurprising, it illustrates that our theory of channel suppression sufﬁces to
re-derive a well-known fact from coding theory.
Channel suppression vs. contamination. Recall program (3.7), restated here:
oT := iT xor jU
This program is essentially the same as program “o := t xor u” from §1. We previously
analyzed program (3.7) and determined that it exhibits 1 bit of channel suppression if Tin
and Uin are uniform distributions on f0;1g. We can also analyze the program for contami-
nation: jT is supplied by a user, and oT is observed by that same user. Calculating C yields
a contamination of 1 bit, indicating that the user learns all the (untrusted) information in iU.
So this program exhibits both contamination and channel suppression, as we argued in §1.
You might wonder how a program with a one-bit output can exhibit both 1 bit of con-
tamination and 1 bit of channel suppression. The answer is that contamination concerns
16Decoded output w equals input m if exactly zero or one bits are ﬂipped during transmission. Each bit is
transmitted correctly with probability p and ﬂipped with probability 1   p. The probability that zero bits are
ﬂipped is thus p
3; the probability that a particular bit is ﬂipped is p
2(1   p); and there are three possible single
bits that could be ﬂipped. So the total probability of correct decoding is p
3 + 3p
2(1   p).
12injection of information (here 1 bit of untrusted information is injected), whereas suppres-
sion concerns loss of information (here 1 bit of trusted information is lost).
Also, recall program (3.6), restated here:
oT := iT xor rnd(1)
This program is essentially the same as program “o := t xor n” from §1. We previously
determined that program (3.6) exhibits 1 bit of channel suppression. Because there are no
untrusted inputs, quantity C of contamination is 0. So this program exhibits only channel
suppression, as we argued in §1.17
Channel suppression and leakage. Recall that leakage (2.7) is the quantity L of infor-
mation ﬂow from secret inputs to public outputs. Leakage can be prevented by employing
channel suppression. Consider a declassiﬁer that accepts trusted, secret inputs and pro-
duces trusted, public outputs. The declassiﬁer’s task is to selectively release some secret
information and suppress the rest. Whatever information is not leaked by the declassiﬁer
ought to have been suppressed.
That intuition is made formal by the following proposition. Let s denote a secret input
event and let p denote a public output event. Let I(s) denote the self-information of event
s.18 Let L1 denote the leakage in a single execution of the declassiﬁer and be deﬁned
as I(s;p); this deﬁnition follows from equation (2.7) by removing the conditioning on
Pin (since the declassiﬁer has no public inputs) and by removing the expectation over all
executions from the deﬁnition of mutual information I (B.6).
Proposition 1. L1 + CS1 = I(s).
So for a given probability distribution of high inputs, leakage plus channel suppression
is a constant. Conﬁdentiality is obtained by eroding integrity, and vice versa. Any security
condition for declassiﬁers—we discuss some in §5—that requires a minimum amount of
conﬁdentiality thereby restricts the maximum amount of integrity. And any utility condition
that requires a minimum amount of integrity thereby restricts the maximum amount of
conﬁdentiality.
3.2 Program Suppression
We now generalize the idea of suppression from communication channels to program cor-
rectness. Consider a speciﬁcation program, depicted in ﬁgure 3: the speciﬁcation receives
a trusted input tin from the sender and produces a correct, trusted output tspec for the re-
ceiver. This idealized program does not interact with the attacker. But in the real world,
an implementation program that does interact with the attacker would be used to realize the
speciﬁcation. The implementation receives trusted input tin from the sender and untrusted
17These arguments implicitly assume that random number generator rnd() is trusted. Untrusted generators
could also be modeled, but we don’t pursue that here.
18Self-information I() is deﬁned in equation (B.1).
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Figure 3: Program suppression model
input uin from the attacker; the implementation then produces untrusted output uout for the
attacker and trusted output timpl for the receiver. A correct implementation would always
produce the correct tspec—that is, timpl would equal tspec. Incorrect implementations thus
produce incorrect outputs, in part because they enable the attacker to inﬂuence the output.
In this model, the receiver observes timpl but is interested in tspec. So the extent to
which timpl informs the receiver about tspec determines how much integrity the implemen-
tation has with respect to the speciﬁcation. We can quantify this extent with information
theory: program transmission is the amount of information that can be learned about tspec
by observing timpl. Likewise, program suppression is the amount of information that timpl
fails to convey about tspec.
Deﬁnition: Programsuppressionistheamountofinformationareceiverfailstolearnabout
the speciﬁcation’s trusted output by observing the implementation’s trusted output.
Let Tspec be the distribution on the speciﬁcation’s trusted outputs, and let Timpl be the
distribution on the implementation’s trusted outputs. These output distributions depend on
trusted input distribution Tin, untrusted input distribution Uin (only for Timpl), and on the
programs’ semantics. Moreover, Tspec and Timpl are based on the same underlying trusted
input—that is, the speciﬁcation and the implementation must be executed with the same
trusted input. We require Tspec to be a (deterministic) function of its input:
H(TspecjTin) = 0: (3.11)
The deﬁnitions of program transmission and program suppression in single executions
(PT1 and PS1) and in expectation (PT and PS) are then as follows:
PT1 , I(tspec;timpl); (3.12)
PS1 , I(tspecjtimpl); (3.13)
PT , I(Tspec;Timpl); (3.14)
PS , H(TspecjTimpl): (3.15)
The rationale for these deﬁnitions remains unchanged from our development of channel
transmission and suppression. Note that the attacker’s inﬂuence is accounted for because
Timpl can depend on Uin.
14Channel transmission and suppression can now be seen as instances of program trans-
mission and suppression for the echo speciﬁcation, which stipulates that tspec equal tin.
(This speciﬁcation is deterministic and therefore satisﬁes equation (3.11).) In §3.1, the out-
put of the channel is called tout, hence timpl equals tout. Given these equalities, we have
that Tspec = Tin and Timpl = Tout. Making these substitutions in the above deﬁnitions
yields the deﬁnitions of channel transmission and channel suppression in single executions
(CT1 and CS1) and in expectation (CT and CS).
Before turning to more compelling examples, we consider the following speciﬁcation
as a corner case:
oT := 42
This speciﬁcation represents a constant function: Tspec is the distribution assigning prob-
ability 1 to output 42. So quantity PS of program suppression is 0 bits, because the en-
tropy of Tspec is 0 regardless of whether it is conditioned on Timpl, hence regardless of
the implementation. Therefore no implementation of a constant function exhibits program
suppression.
Examples of program suppression. Consider the following speciﬁcation SumSpec for
computing the sum of array a, which contains m elements indexed from 0 to m   1:
SumSpec : for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
f s := s+a[i]; g
(Assume throughout that s is initially 0.)
Programmers frequently introduce off-by-one errors into loop guards. Implementation
UnderSum exhibits such an error by omitting array element a[0]:
UnderSum : for (i = 1; i < m; i++)
f s := s+a[i]; g
Conversely, implementation OverSum adds a[m], which is not an element of a:
OverSum : for (i = 0; i <= m; i++)
f s := s+a[i]; g
Suppose that each array element a[i] is identically, independently distributed accord-
ing to a binomial distribution with parameters n and p. Let Bin(n;p) denote this distribu-
tion.19 Alsosupposethatthevaluefoundina[m]isuniformlydistributedonintegerinterval
[0;2j 1]; let Unif (0;2j 1) denote this distribution. We consider elements a[0]..a[m-1]
19A binomial distribution models the probability of the number of successes obtained in a series of n exper-
iments, each of which succeeds with probability p. We choose this distribution because it enjoys a convenient
summation property—if X  Bin(nx;p) and Y  Bin(ny;p), then X + Y  Bin(nx + ny;p), where
Z  D denotes that random variable Z is distributed according to distribution D—and because it illustrates
that our theory is not limited to uniform distributions.
15to be properly initialized according to their binomial distribution and therefore to be trusted.
But a[m] is not an element of the array, so it might have been initialized by the attacker;
we therefore consider a[m] to be untrusted.
UnderSum exhibits the following quantity PSUS of program suppression:
PSUS =
X
s02Bin(n;p);
i2Bin(n(m 1);p)
Pr(s0)Pr(i)logPr(s0): (3.16)
(The full calculation of PSUS, as well as the calculations for equations (3.17) and (3.18)
below, appears in appendix A.) So if m = 10, n = 1, and p = 0:5, then PSUS is 1 bit.
This quantity is intuitively sensible: the implementation omits array element a[0], which
is distributed according to Bin(1;0:5), and the entropy of that distribution is 1 bit (because
it assigns probability 0:5 to each of two values, 0 and 1). Moreover, this analysis suggests
that UnderSum always exhibits program suppression equal to the entropy of the distribution
on a[0]:
PS = H(Bin(n;p)): (3.17)
Indeed, it is straightforward to reduce equation (3.16) to equation (3.17). Hence, UnderSum
suppresses exactly the information about the omitted array element.
OverSum exhibits a different quantity PSOS of program suppression:
PSOS =
X
s2Bin(mn;p);
i02Unif (0;2j 1)
2 j Pr(s)log
2 j Pr(s)
Pr(s + i0)
: (3.18)
Now if m = 10, n = 1, p = 0:5, and j = 1, then PSOS is about 0:93 bits. The 1 bit of
randomness added by the attacker through a[m], which is uniformly distributed on f0;1g,
suppresses nearly 1 bit of information from the sum. The program suppression is not fully
1 bit because there are corner-case values that completely determine what the summands
are—for example, if the sum is 0, then all array elements are 0 and the attacker’s input is
0. As m increases, PSOS approaches 1, because such corner cases occur with decreasing
probability. So in the limit, the attacker can exploit memory location a[m] to suppress a
single array element.20
Probabilistic speciﬁcations. Equation (3.11) requires speciﬁcations to be deterministic.
Consider eliminating that requirement and allowing probabilistic speciﬁcations—for ex-
ample, “oT := rnd(1)”. This speciﬁcation stipulates that the output must be 0 or 1, and
that each output must occur with probability 1
2. There is no correct output according to
20This kind of analysis might be used to provide a mathematical explanation of why failure-oblivious com-
puting (FOC) [39] is successful at increasing software robustness. FOC rewrites out-of-bounds array reads to
return strategically-chosen values that enable software to survive memory errors. Perhaps the choice of values
could be understood as minimizing program suppression; we leave further investigation as future work.
16this speciﬁcation; instead, there is a correct distribution on outputs. And program sup-
pression should be the amount of information the receiver fails to learn about that correct
distribution—rather than about a correct output—by observing the implementation. When
quantifying suppression of correct outputs, we needed a probability distribution on outputs
to model the receiver’s uncertainty. To quantify suppression of correct distributions, we
would need an extra level of distributions: a probability distribution on a probability distri-
bution on outputs. So far, we have modeled only discrete probability distributions, which
have ﬁnite support. But there are inﬁnitely many probability distributions on outputs, so
it seems we would need to upgrade our model with continuous probability distributions
and differential entropy (the continuous analogue of entropy). We leave this mathematical
upgrade as future work.
Duality. Program suppression is the amount of information the implementation’s trusted
output fails to reveal about the trusted output that is correct according to the speciﬁcation.
Applying the Biba duality, the conﬁdentiality dual of program suppression would be the
amount of information that the implementation’s public output fails to reveal about the
public output that is correct according to the speciﬁcation. For conﬁdentiality, this ﬂow
is uninteresting: the amount of information that ﬂows—or fails to ﬂow—to public outputs
does not characterize how a program leaks or hides secret information. So there does not
seem to be a dual to suppression.
Other notions of integrity also lack obvious conﬁdentiality duals—for example, the
Clark–Wilson [10] integrity policy for commercial organizations, based on well-formed
transactions and veriﬁcation procedures. Apparently, the Biba duality goes only so far.
Suppression vs. availability. If a program (or channel) suppresses all its input, the re-
ceiver gains no information. It might at ﬁrst seem as though the program has made the
correct output unavailable, so we might be tempted to conclude that suppression measures
availability rather than integrity. However, availability is usually concerned with timely
response—not with quality of information—whereas suppression is concerned with quality,
not timeliness. Furthermore, techniques typically employed to prevent suppression differ
from those for improving availability. For example, error-correcting codes defend against
(channel) suppression, but they do not improve availability—if a channel goes down (e.g.,
a wire is cut), a code cannot restore communication. And replication improves availability
but potentially introduces (program) suppression, because different replicas might provide
differentresponsesandcombiningthoseresponsesmightyieldincorrectoutput. Hashesand
digital signatures are therefore used in conjunction with replication to increase integrity by
ensuring correct output.
Completeabsenceofinformationcouldbeviewedascompleteconﬁdentiality, complete
loss of integrity, or complete unavailability. Thus some quantitative relaxation of “complete
absence” could yield quantitative characterizations of conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availabil-
ity. So there might be some interesting relationships—perhaps even new dualities—still to
be found.
174 Integrity and Beliefs
In our models of contamination and suppression, inputs are chosen according to probability
distributions. For example, the user assumes that untrusted inputs are chosen according to
distribution Uin in our model of contamination. But the user could be wrong—the inputs
could be chosen according to a different distribution; a calculation of information ﬂow
would then need to incorporate both distributions.
Clarkson et al. [11,12] show how to quantify leakage from secret inputs to public out-
puts when attackers have (possibly incorrect) beliefs about the inputs. And since leakage is
dual to contamination, that belief-based approach ought to work for quantifying contamina-
tion. We show that it does, next, as well as adapt it to suppression. For both contamination
and suppression, the belief-based approach turns out to generalize the information-theoretic
approach used so far in this paper.
4.1 Contamination and Beliefs
Deﬁne a belief to be a probability distribution of untrusted inputs. The user has a prebelief
Uin about untrusted input event uin. Recall that uin is unobservable by the user. The user
instead observes the trusted input and output, enabling the user to reﬁne Uin to a postbelief
U0
in about uin.
Unless the user’s prebelief assigns probability 1 to uin, the prebelief is inaccurate. To
quantify inaccuracy, we stipulate a function D such that D(X _ Y ) is the inaccuracy of
belief X about reality Y; where Y is also a distribution. Intuitively, D(X _ Y ) is the
distance from the belief to reality. In previous work [12], we showed that relative entropy
can successfully instantiate D:
D(X _ Y ) ,
X
x
Pr(Y = x)log
Pr(Y = x)
Pr(X = x)
: (4.1)
The right-hand side of this deﬁnition is the relative entropy21 between Y and X.
Since reality is, in our model of contamination, always a distribution that assigns prob-
ability 1 to event uin, we can simplify our notation and deﬁnition. Let D(X _ x) be the
inaccuracy of belief X about event x:
D(X _ x) ,  logPr(X = x): (4.2)
Equation (4.2) follows from (4.1) by setting Y to be a distribution that assigns probability
1 to event x. This simpliﬁed deﬁnition is equivalent to self-information22—that is,
D(X _ x) = I(x); (4.3)
where the probability of x in the calculation of self-information I(x) is speciﬁed by X.
21The traditional notation for the relative entropy between Y and X is D(Y k X), but we use notation
D(X _ Y ) to emphasize the asymmetry between the two distributions. Also, we abuse notation by treating
distributions as random variables in the probability terms.
22Self-information I() is deﬁned in equation (B.1).
18Quantity CB of contamination of beliefs is the improvement in accuracy of the user’s
belief, because the more accurate the belief becomes, the more untrusted information the
user has learned:
CB , D(Uin _ uin)   D(U0
in _ uin): (4.4)
In previous work [12], we deﬁned an experiment protocol for calculating a postbelief from
a prebelief and a probabilistic program semantics. That protocol turns out to be equiva-
lent to calculating U0
in according to equation (2.4): U0
in equals Uin conditioned on tin and
tout. Furthermore, the quantity of contamination according to CB equals the quantity of
contamination according to C1 (2.1).
Theorem 1. CB = C1.
Thus belief-based quantiﬁcation is equivalent to mutual information-based quantiﬁcation
on single executions.
Moreover, deﬁne belief Uin to be correct if the attacker chooses uin by sampling user
prebelief Uin—that is, if the user is correct about how untrusted inputs are chosen. Then
applying the expectation operator to both sides of theorem 1, we have that the expected
quantity of contamination of beliefs equals the expected quantity of contamination accord-
ing to C (2.6).
Corollary 1. Uin is correct implies E[CB] = C.
Thus belief-based quantiﬁcation generalizes mutual information-based quantiﬁcation.
Corollary 1 can also be understood in terms of leakage by applying the duality of con-
tamination C and leakage L (2.7). If the attacker’s distribution Sin on secret inputs is
correct, the expected quantity of leakage according to the belief-based approach equals the
quantity of leakage according to the mutual information-based approach. So corollary 1
also establishes how belief-based and mutual information-based measures for conﬁdential-
ity are related: the mutual information measure is a special case of the belief measure.
4.2 Suppression and Beliefs
In our model of contamination, the user holds beliefs about untrusted inputs. To model
channel suppression, we replaced the user with a sender and a receiver. So to model channel
suppression with beliefs, we now regard the receiver as the agent who holds beliefs. The
receiver’s joint prebelief (Tin;Uin) characterizes the receiver’s uncertainty about trusted
input tin supplied by the sender and untrusted input uin supplied by the attacker. And the
receiver’s postbelief T0
in characterizes the receiver’s uncertainty about the untrusted input
after observing the trusted output, so T0
in equals Tin conditioned on tout. The improve-
ment in the accuracy of the receiver’s belief is the quantity CTB of belief-based channel
transmission:
CTB , D(Tin _ tin)   D(T0
in _ tin): (4.5)
Term D(T0
in _ tin) characterizes the remaining error in the receiver’s postbelief, hence the
quantity of information that the receiver did not learn about tin. So D(T0
in _ tin) is the
19quantity CSB of belief-based channel suppression:
CSB , D(T0
in _ tin): (4.6)
Unsurprisingly, the following results—corresponding to those we obtained for contami-
nation—hold. For the corollary, we extend the deﬁnition of correct prebelief to mean that
(Tin;Uin) is correct if inputs tin and uin are chosen by the sender and attacker by sampling
distributions Tin and Uin, respectively.
Theorem 2. CTB = CT1 and CSB = CS1.
Corollary 2. (Tin;Uin) is correct implies E[CTB] = CT and E[CSB] = CS.
Thus the belief-based deﬁnition of channel suppression generalizes the mutual information-
based deﬁnition.
Likewise, we can generalize belief-based channel suppression and transmission to pro-
gram suppression and transmission. Let T0
spec = Tspecjtimpl. The following deﬁnitions of
belief-based program transmission PTB and belief-based program suppression PSB are
straightforward generalizations of equations (4.5) and (4.6):
PTB , D(Tspec _ tspec)   D(T0
spec _ tspec); (4.7)
PSB , D(T0
spec _ tspec): (4.8)
We obtain the obvious result:
Corollary 3. PTB = PT1 and PSB = PS1. Further, (Tin;Uin) is correct implies
E[PTB] = PT and E[PSB] = PS.
So belief-based deﬁnitions again generalize mutual information-based deﬁnitions.
5 Case Study: Database Privacy
Databases that contain information about individuals sometimes must respond to queries
in a way that protects the privacy of those individuals. Such databases often will employ
an anonymizer to suppress information about individuals. We model the anonymizer as a
program that receives two inputs, as depicted in ﬁgure 4. The ﬁrst input is the user’s query.
The second input is a response computed by the database with the user’s query. Both inputs
are trusted by the anonymizer and by the user. The response contains information from the
database—perhaps even its entire contents—so the response is secret. The query, however,
is public because it contains no sensitive information about individuals. The anonymizer
produces an anonymized response as output.23 The anonymized response is trusted by the
user and is public, because it (presumably) has been anonymized. Although the query
and responses might involve statistics (e.g., sums or averages) computed from individuals’
information, we do not restrict our consideration to any particular statistics. Our model is
agnostic about the domains of queries and data.
23The anonymizer might also produce some output about the anonymization it just performed, and this output
might be stored in the database and used during future anonymizations.
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Figure 4: Anonymizer model
The user attempts to learn secret information about individuals through queries. The
anonymizer should leak some information to the user; otherwise, interacting with it would
be pointless. And the anonymizer acts as a noisy communication channel, where the
database is the sender and the user is the receiver.24 The anonymizer suppresses some
information from this channel’s outputs to protect privacy. By proposition 1, the amount
of leakage plus the amount of channel suppression is a constant that depends on the distri-
bution of database content. This is sensible—whatever the anonymizer doesn’t suppress, it
leaks.
The quantitative frameworks we have developed for integrity and conﬁdentiality yield
a nuanced characterization of database privacy. We demonstrate this by analyzing two
popular security conditions, k-anonymity [45] and `-diversity [29]. For each, we are able
to offer an information-theoretic characterization of the security condition.
k k k-anonymity. Sweeney [45] proposes k-anonymity, a security condition for anonymizers,
which requires every individual to be anonymous within some set (of individuals) of size at
least k. For example, if Alice was born Nov. 26, 1865, and if gender and birth date are both
published, then at least k  1 other females born that day must be included in the published
data. If the original database does not contain at least that many individuals, the data must
be changed in some way to satisfy k-anonymity. Sweeney proposes generalization, which
hierarchically replaces attributes values with less speciﬁc values. For example, Alice’s birth
date might be replaced by Nov. 1865, by 1865, or even by 18**. Generalization improves
conﬁdentiality by obscuring identities, but it diminishes the information conveyed—that
is, generalization corrupts integrity. That tradeoff is unsurprising in light of proposition 1.
Sweeney quantiﬁes the integrity of generalized data with a precision metric that is based on
the generalization hierarchy and the domains used in it.
Adapting Sweeney’s insight to information ﬂow, we could imagine requiring that the
public output of a program corresponds to at least k possible secret inputs. This requirement
would make any particular input be anonymous within a set of size k. We have the tools to
analyze how generalization affects our notions of leakage and channel suppression.25 As
an example, consider generalization of birth dates. Assume that birth dates are uniformly
24Alternatively, we could use program suppression to model anonymizers instead of channel suppression.
The anonymizer would be an implementation program; the speciﬁcation would be the query evaluator. Channel
suppression is simpler—it does not require modeling the query evaluator.
25Sweeney deﬁnes “suppression” differently than we do; she uses it to mean the complete removal of an
individual’s information from the output.
21distributed within a given year—for example, 1865.26 Then, according to our deﬁnitions,
a program that outputs the entire input date leaks about 8.5 bits and suppresses 0 bits; a
program that outputs just the month and year leaks about 3.6 bits and suppresses about 4.9
bits; and a program that outputs just the year leaks 0 bits and suppresses about 8.5 bits.
Moreover, leakageandchannelsuppressionenableaninformation-theoreticunderstand-
ing of generalization. Channel suppression quantiﬁes how much information is lost because
ofgeneralization, whereasSweeney’sprecisionmetrichasnoobviousinformation-theoretic
interpretation. And leakage quantiﬁes how much information is released despite generaliza-
tion, whereas k-anonymity makes no guarantees on how much information might be leaked.
For example, suppose that published data includes a medical diagnosis and a favorite pet.
If it is known that Alice’s favorite pet is a cat and that the rest of the individuals in the
population are highly unlikely to have a cat as a favorite pet, then Alice’s medical diagno-
sis could be inferred with high probability. Thus information about Alice would be leaked
despite k-anonymity. As another example, if a program’s output could have been caused
by any one of k possible inputs, but one of those inputs is much more probable than the
rest, then information about the input would be leaked despite k-anonymity. These kinds
of leakage—made possible by the attacker’s background knowledge—were discovered by
Machanavajjhala et al. [29], who invented a new criterion, `-diversity. We turn to that, next.
` ` `-diversity. The principle of `-diversity [29] is that published data should not only make
every individual’s sensitive information appear to have at least ` possible values, but that
each of those values should have roughly equal probability. This principle blunts back-
ground knowledge attacks, which depend on some sensitive values having signiﬁcantly
higher probability than the rest.
Machanavajjhala et al. [29] give an instantiation of the `-diversity principle based on
entropy, as follows. Deﬁne a block to be a set of tuples in which each tuple corresponds
to an individual and in which every individual has the same values for non-sensitive at-
tributes. For example, a block might contain all the tuples corresponding to individuals
whose birth date is 18** and whose favorite pet is a cat. However, individuals in the block
may (indeed, should) have different values for their sensitive attributes. We can construct
an empirical probability distribution of sensitive attributes in the block by taking their rel-
ative frequencies—for example, given the following block, the distribution would assign
probability 0.5 to cancer and 0.25 to both heart disease and inﬂuenza:
Non-sensitive Sensitive
Birth date Favorite pet Diagnosis
18** cat cancer
18** cat cancer
18** cat heart disease
18** cat inﬂuenza
26Birth dates are, in reality, probably not uniformly distributed [32].
22For each such probability distribution B constructed from a block of published data, en-
tropy `-diversity requires that H(B)  log` holds, where H(B) denotes the entropy of
distribution B.27 Applying this deﬁnition, we have that the block above is 1.5-diverse. No-
tice that it is not 2-diverse because the two most frequent sensitive values (either cancer and
heart disease, or cancer and inﬂuenza) do not occur with roughly equal probability—cancer
is twice as likely as the other diagnoses.
More generally, consider any block with distribution B that satisﬁes entropy `-diversity.
The entropy of a uniform distribution of ` events is log`. So if H(B)  log`, we have that
B is at least as uncertain as a distribution of sensitive information in which the information
has at least ` possible values, all of which are equally likely. Hence entropy `-diversity is
an instantiation of the `-diversity principle.
We now recast entropy `-diversity in terms of information ﬂow. In the example above,
B is the distribution on the diagnosis of an arbitrary patient that results from observing
the block. More generally, B is the distribution on trusted (secret) inputs that results from
observing a block, which is a trusted (public) output, under the assumption that the ob-
server’s initial distribution Tin on inputs is uniform. (Were it not uniform, B would be a
function of the block’s empirical distribution and the observer’s initial distribution.) Hence,
B = Tinjtout. And since H(B)  log`, we have that H(Tinjtout)  log` for any tout
produced by the anonymizer. We can use this fact to obtain a bound on the anonymizer’s
channel suppression:
CS = hequation (3.5)i
H(TinjTout)
= hequation (B.11)i
Etout2Tout[H(Tinjtout)]
 hfact abovei
Etout2Tout[log`]
= hexpectation of constanti
log`:
So we have that CS  log`. As a straightforward consequence of its deﬁnition, entropy
`-diversity therefore enforces a bound on channel suppression.
Interpreting that bound, suppose that an individual is in the block from which B was
constructed, and suppose that Tin is uniform—meaning that the individual is equally likely
to have any value for his sensitive attributes. Then B yields the probability distribution
on that individual’s sensitive attributes that results from observing the published block.
Entropy `-diversity requires at least log` bits of uncertainty in that distribution. So at least
log` bits of information are suppressed about the individual’s sensitive attributes.
27Entropy H() is deﬁned in equation (B.9). The deﬁnition of entropy `-diversity originates with Øhrn and
Ohno-Machado [37].
23However, entropy `-diversity does not directly place a bound on the amount of informa-
tion that may be transmitted; beyond the log` bits that are suppressed, there might be many
bits that are transmitted about an individual. For example, there might be
• a lot of information about the individual (e.g., an entire DNA sequence) already
present in the input, little of which is suppressed; or
• a lot of background knowledge about the individual already possessed by the user,
enabling inference of a lot of information from the output.
To measure the utility of published data—that is, how useful the data is for studying the
characteristics of a population—Machanavajjhala et al. [29] and Kifer and Gehrke [23] use
an information-theoretic metric called Kullback-Leibler divergence. This metric is another
nameforrelativeentropyD (4.1). LetB beanempiricalprobabilitydistributionofsensitive
attributes, as constructed above from anonymized data.28 And let R be an empirical distri-
bution similarly constructed from the original (non-anonymous) data. Their utility measure
is the relative entropy of B to R—that is, D(B _ R). Notice that the best possible utility
is 0, meaning that B and R are the same distribution, and that the higher the utility is, the
less the distributions are alike. So we call this metric anti-utility.
Again recasting in terms of information ﬂow, note that anti-utility is the distance be-
tween two distributions: an empirical distribution of trusted inputs, after observing trusted
outputs; and an empirical distribution of trusted inputs. Were we to ignore the “empirical”
part of that characterization, we could say that anti-utility is D(Tinjtout _ Tin), which is
the expectation of D(Tinjtout _ tin) with respect to tin. That latter quantity is CSB (4.6),
because T0
in = Tinjtout. And by corollary 2, expected belief-based channel suppression
E[CSB] is equal to information-theoretic channel suppression CS. So anti-utility would be
the quantity of channel suppression if we used real, instead of empirical, distributions.29
This equivalence is sensible, because the less suppression data suffers, the more useful it is.
6 Related Work
Quantitative. Research on quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow began with analysis of co-
vert channels, and progress has been made from theoretical deﬁnitions to automated anal-
yses [2,7,19,28,30]. Quantiﬁcation of integrity and corruption is a relatively new line of
research.
Newsome, McCamant, and Song [35] implement a dynamic analysis that automatically
quantiﬁes attacker inﬂuence in real-world programs. They quantify the inﬂuence an at-
tacker can exert over the execution of a program as the logarithm of the size of the set of
possible outputs. This quantity is the same as our contamination C1 in a single execution,
assuming that programs are deterministic and that all inputs are either under the control of
28We simplify their deﬁnition here. They deﬁne B as the maximum entropy distribution with respect to
empirical distributions calculated from several published data sets.
29Deﬁnitions of anti-utility [23,29] use empirical distributions because they deal with concrete databases and
anonymizations.
24the attacker or are ﬁxed constants. But our deﬁnition of C1 allows probabilistic programs,
trusted inputs that are not under the control of the attacker, and arbitrary distributions on
inputs and outputs.
Heusser and Malacaria [20] quantify the information leaked by a database query. They
model database queries as programs, which enables application of their general purpose,
automated, static analysis of leakage for C programs. Their work does not address integrity
or relate information ﬂow to existing database-privacy security conditions.
Qualitative. Biba [4] deﬁnes the integrity problem as the formulation of “policies and
mechanisms that provide a subsystem with the isolation necessary for protection from sub-
version.” He formulates several such policies, one of which (termed the “strict integrity
policy”) is dual to the Bell–LaPadula conﬁdentiality policy [3]. But since Biba’s motivat-
ing concern was guaranteeing that systems perform as their designers intended, correct-
ness is also a critical piece of the integrity puzzle. Our program suppression measure PS
addresses correctness; perhaps other quantitative notions of correctness, such as software
testing metrics, could also be understood as addressing quantitative integrity.
Information-ﬂow integrity policies have sometimes received less attention than their
conﬁdentiality counterparts. For example, early versions of Jif [33] (then called JFlow)
did not include integrity policies, and Flow Caml [38] does not distinguish conﬁdentiality
from integrity but instead uses an arbitrary lattice of security levels. But work on securing
information ﬂows in distributed systems programmed in Jif led to an appreciation for the
role of information-ﬂow integrity policies, because they were needed to “protect security-
critical information from damage by subverted hosts” [50]—an instance of Biba’s integrity
problem. Securing information ﬂows in the presence of declassiﬁcation (when, e.g., secret
information is reclassiﬁed as public) also turned out to require integrity policies, so that
attackers could not gain control over what information is declassiﬁed [49]. So integrity
cannot be easily dismissed, even when conﬁdentiality is the primary concern.
Several recent systems use integrity policies in interesting ways. Jif-derived languages
and systems [5,6,26] for building secure distributed applications incorporate integrity poli-
cies, enabling principals to specify ﬁne-grained requirements on how their information may
be affected by other principals. These policies drive automated partitioning of applications,
in which computations can be assigned to principals who are sufﬁciently trusted to perform
the computations. When no such principals exist, computations can be replicated and their
results validated against each other to boost integrity. Flume [25]—a system that integrates
information ﬂow with operating system abstractions such as processes, pipes, and sockets—
also incorporates integrity policies, preventing (e.g.) untrusted dynamically-loaded code
from affecting information in the process that loads it. Airavat [40] integrates information
ﬂow with MapReduce [16] and differential privacy [18], providing conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity for MapReduce computations and automatically declassifying computation results
if they do not violate differential privacy.
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Figure 5: Information-ﬂow integrity in a program
7 Concluding Remarks
When we began this work, we thought we could simply apply Biba’s conﬁdentiality–
integrity duality to obtain a quantitative model of integrity from previous work on quantita-
tive conﬁdentiality. We soon discovered that the resulting model, which we named contam-
ination, was not same as the classical information-theoretic model of quantitative integrity,
which we named channel suppression. We later discovered that channel suppression could
be generalized to characterize program correctness, yielding another kind of quantitative
integrity.
Are there other kinds of (quantitative) integrity waiting to be discovered? We suspect
so. We have not dealt, for example, with the Clark–Wilson [10] integrity policy, which
stipulates the use of trusted procedures to modify data. Nor have we dealt with database
integrity constraints, which stipulate conditions that database records must satisfy.
We cannot even attempt to prove that contamination and suppression are sufﬁcient to
express all integrity properties, because we lack a formal deﬁnition of integrity. But we
can gain some insight by reviewing the information-ﬂow model we have used in this paper,
depicted in ﬁgure 5. The solid arrows in this ﬁgure represent two kinds of integrity that we
identiﬁed, contamination (ﬂow from uin to tout) and channel suppression (attenuation of
ﬂow from tin to tout). The dashed arrows represent ﬂows that are uninteresting from our
security perspective: it does not matter how much trusted or untrusted information ﬂows
to untrusted outputs. Since these four arrows represent all possible ﬂows, we conclude that
contamination and channel suppression are the only interesting integrity properties in this
information-ﬂow model. Other kinds of integrity must exist outside it.
Finally, our work exempliﬁes how measurement can drive research, even in computer
security. In an effort to measure integrity, we came to disentangle suppression from contam-
ination. We also bridged a gap between database privacy and quantitative information-ﬂow
security. Lord Kelvin had it right:
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you
know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express
it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre [sic] and unsatisfactory kind; it may be
the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the
state of Science.
—William Thomson, 1st Baron Kelvin30
30From “Electrical Units of Measurement”, a lecture delivered at the Institution of Civil Engineers in London
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30A Proofs
In the main body, we used I() to denote information with respect to an implicit proba-
bility distribution; that distribution was always clear from context. In the proofs, it will
sometimes be helpful to make the distribution explicit. So we now let IX() denote infor-
mation according to distribution X—for example, IX(x) is the self-information of event x
according to distribution X.
Calculation of UnderSum program suppression.
PSUS = hdeﬁnition (3.15)i
H(TspecjTimpl)
= hdeﬁnition (B.10)i
X
s2Tspec;i2Timpl
Pr(s;i)logPr(sji)
= hdeﬁnition of Tspec for UnderSum (see below)i
X
s02Bin(n;p);i2Timpl
Pr(s0;i)logPr(s0ji)
= hdeﬁnition of Timpl for UnderSumi
X
s02Bin(n;p);i2Bin(n(m 1);p)
Pr(s0;i)logPr(s0ji)
= hs0 is independent of i; this yields equation (3.16)i
X
s02Bin(n;p);i2Bin(n(m 1);p)
Pr(s0)Pr(i)logPr(s0)
= hdistributivityi
0
@
X
s02Bin(n;p)
Pr(s0)logPr(s0)
1
A
0
@
X
i2Bin(n(m 1);p)
Pr(i)
1
A
= hdeﬁnition (B.9)i
H(Bin(n;p))
0
@
X
i2Bin(n(m 1);p)
Pr(i)
1
A
= hprobability distribution must sum to 1i
H(Bin(n;p)):
In the third step, we introduce bound variable s0 such that s = i+s0. Variable s0 represents
array element a[0]. By the deﬁnitions of UnderSum and SumSpec, we have that s =
i + a[0] and a[0]  Bin(n;p;). Hence s0  Bin(n;p).
31Calculation of OverSum program suppression.
PSOS = hDeﬁnition (3.15)i
H(TspecjTimpl)
= hdeﬁnition (B.10)i
X
s2Tspec;i2Timpl
Pr(s;i)logPr(sji)
= hdeﬁnition of Tspec for OverSumi
X
s2Bin(mn;p);i2Timpl
Pr(s;i)logPr(sji)
= hdeﬁnition of Timpl for OverSum (see below)i
X
s2Bin(mn;p);i02Unif (0;2j 1)
Pr(s;i0)logPr(sjs + i0)
= hdeﬁnition of conditional probabilityi
X
s2Bin(mn;p);i02Unif (0;2j 1)
Pr(s;i0)log
Pr(s;s + i0)
Pr(s + i0)
= hs is independent of i0i
X
s2Bin(mn;p);i02Unif (0;2j 1)
Pr(s)Pr(i0)log
Pr(s)Pr(i0)
Pr(s + i0)
= hPr(i0) = 2 j; this yields equation (3.18).i
X
s2Bin(mn;p);i02Unif (0;2j 1)
2 j Pr(s)log
2 j Pr(s)
Pr(s + i0)
In the fourth step, we introduce bound variable i0 such that i = s+i0. Variable i0 represents
memory location a[m]. By the deﬁnitions of OverSum and SumSpec, we have that i =
s + a[m] and a[m]  Unif (0;2j   1). Hence i0  Unif (0;2j   1).
Proposition 1. L1 + CS1 = I(s):
Proof. By deﬁnition, L1 = I(s;p), where s is the secret, trusted input and p is the public,
trusted output. Also by deﬁnition (3.3), CS1 = I(tinjtout). Since s instantiates tin and p
instantiates tout, we have that CS1 = I(sjp). By equation (B.3), I(sjp) = I(s)   I(s;p),
hence CS1 = I(s)   I(s;p). Therefore, L1 + CS1 = I(s;p) + I(s)   I(s;p) = I(s).
Theorem 1. CB = C1.
Proof. By deﬁnition (4.4), CB = D(Uin _ uin)   D(U0
in _ uin). Applying equa-
tion (4.3) twice to that equality, we have that CB = IUin(uin)   IU0
in(uin). Since un-
trusted inputs are independent of trusted inputs, Pr(uin) = Pr(uinjtin), hence IUin(uin) =
32IUin(uinjtin). Also, by equation (2.4), U0
in = Uin jtin;tout. So we have that IU0
in(uin) =
IUin jtin;tout(uin) = IUin(uin jtin;tout). Thus,
CB = IUin(uinjtin)   IUin(uin jtin;tout):
For the rest of this proof, all self-information will be in terms of distribution Uin, so we
cease writing that subscript on I. By deﬁnition (2.1), C1 = I(uin;tout jtin). So, to show
that C1 = CB, it sufﬁces to show that
I(uin;tout jtin) = I(uinjtin)   I(uin jtin;tout):
The following lemma does just that.
Lemma 1. I(x;z jy) = I(xjy)   I(xjy;z):
Proof. Intuitively, thislemmaisthesameasequation(B.3), butwitheverytermconditioned
on y. Formally, we calculate, starting with the left-hand side of the lemma:
I(x;z jy) = hdeﬁnition (B.7)i
  log
Pr(xjy)Pr(zjy)
Pr(x;zjy)
= hdeﬁnition Pr(ajb), twicei
  log
Pr(xjy)Pr(z;y)Pr(y)
Pr(x;z;y)Pr(y)
= hsimpliﬁcationi
  log
Pr(xjy)Pr(y;z)
Pr(x;y;z)
:
Similarly, we calculate, starting with the right-hand side of the lemma:
I(xjy)   I(xjy;z) = hdeﬁnition (B.7), twicei
  (logPr(xjy)   logPr(xjy;z))
= hlog identityi
  log
Pr(xjy)
Pr(xjy;z)
= hdeﬁnition Pr(ajb)i
  log
Pr(xjy)Pr(y;z)
Pr(x;y;z)
:
Both sides of the lemma turned out to equal the same formula. We therefore have that
I(x;z jy) =  log
Pr(xjy)Pr(y;z)
Pr(x;z;y)
= I(xjy)   I(xjy;z):
33Corollary 1. Uin is correct implies E[CB] = C.
Proof. Let ED[] denote expectation with respect to distribution D. In the calculation
of E[CB], the user’s prebelief Uin could in general differ from the actual distribution R
on untrusted inputs. Expectation E[CB] should be with respect to R, since R yields the
actual probabilities that should be used as weights in the expectation’s weighted aver-
age. However, by the assumption that Uin is correct, we have that Uin = R. Therefore,
E[CB] = EUin[C1] = C, where the ﬁrst equality follows from theorem 1 and the second
equality follows from equation (2.5).
Theorem 2. CTB = CT1 and CSB = CS1.
Proof. In this proof, I() abbreviates ITin()—that is, if no subscript is present on I, the
self-information is with respect to distribution Tin.
By deﬁnition, CSB = D(T0
in _ tin). By equation (4.3), we have that D(T0
in _ tin) =
IT0
in(tin). By the deﬁnition of T0
in, we have that IT0
in(tin) = I(tinjtout). And that last term
is the deﬁnition of CS1 (3.3). Therefore, CSB = CS1.
By deﬁnition,
CTB = D(Tin _ tin)   D(T0
in _ tin);
and by equation (3.2),
CT1 = I(tin)   I(tinjtout):
By the deﬁnitions of CSB (4.6) and CS1 (3.3), we can rewrite those equalities as follows:
CTB = D(Tin _ tin)   CSB;
CT1 = I(tin)   CS1:
By equation (4.3), we have that D(Tin _ tin) = I(tin). Therefore, since CSB = CS1, we
have that CTB = CT1.
Corollary 2. (Tin;Uin) is correct implies E[CTB] = CT and E[CSB] = CS.
Proof. The proof technique is the same as in the proof of corollary 1. In short, if (Tin;Uin)
is correct, then theorem 2 implies that E[CTB] = E(Tin;Uin)[CT1] = CT , and likewise for
E[CSB] and CS.
Corollary 3. PTB = PT1 and PSB = PS1. Further, (Tin;Uin) is correct implies
E[PTB] = PT and E[PSB] = PS.
Proof. The proof of each statement is the same, up to renaming, as the proof of the corre-
sponding statement in theorem 2 or corollary 2. The only additional fact needed is that if
(Tin;Uin) is correct, then Tspec and Timpl are also correct. That fact holds because Tspec
and Timpl are deﬁned in terms of Tin, Uin, and the program semantics—which is known to
the receiver.
34B Information Theory Review
This appendix reviews all the basic deﬁnitions from information theory used in the paper.
More details can be found in any introductory text [15,22].
The self-information (or simply information) I(x) conveyed by a single event x that
occurs with probability Pr(x) is deﬁned as follows:
I(x) ,  logPr(x): (B.1)
The base of the logarithm determines the unit of measurement for information. We assume
base 2 for all logarithms, so the unit of measurement is bits. In effect, I(x) quantiﬁes how
surprising event x is:
• The information conveyed by an event that is certain (i.e., an event with probability
1) is 0—such an event is completely unsurprising.
• As the probability of an event approaches 0, the information conveyed by it ap-
proaches inﬁnity, because the event becomes inﬁnitely surprising. The quantity of
information conveyed by an impossible event (i.e., probability 0) is undeﬁned.
• If Pr(x) > Pr(y), then I(x) < I(y), because the occurrence of event x is less
surprising than event y.
• If x and y are independent events, the information conveyed by the occurrence of
both x and y is I(x) + I(y). The surprise of x occurring is unaffected by whether y
occurs, and vice versa.
The conditional information I(xjy) conveyed by event x, given that event y has oc-
curred, is the information conveyed by an event with conditional probability Pr(xjy):
I(xjy) ,  logPr(xjy): (B.2)
The mutual information I(x;y) between events x and y is the quantity of information
that the two events have in common—that is, the information about x conveyed by y, or
symmetrically, the amount of information about y conveyed by x. So we would expect the
following equalities to hold:
I(x;y) = I(x)   I(xjy) (B.3)
= I(y)   I(yjx): (B.4)
In equation (B.3), I(x) is how much information could possibly be obtained about x, and
I(xjy) is the amount remaining to obtain after observing y; the difference between these
two quantities is the amount actually obtained about x by observing the occurrence of y.
(Equation (B.4), where x is observed, is symmetric.) Since Pr(x;y) = Pr(xjy)  Pr(y),
35mutual information I(x;y) can also be expressed as follows:
I(x;y) = I(x)   I(xjy)
=  logPr(x) + logPr(xjy)
,  log
Pr(x)Pr(y)
Pr(x;y)
: (B.5)
We take that last expression as the deﬁnition of mutual information between events. Note
that if x and y are independent, their mutual information is 0.
Generalizing to distributions on events, the mutual information I(X;Y ) between two
distributions X and Y is the expected amount of information between all events x 2 X and
y 2 Y :
I(X;Y ) , E[I(X;Y )] (B.6)
=  
X
x;y
Pr(x;y)log
Pr(x)Pr(y)
Pr(x;y)
:
E denotes the expectation operator. By convention, 0log0 = 0 in this summation (and
throughout this paper). Again note that if X and Y are independent, their mutual informa-
tion is 0.
To conclude our development, let IN be a distribution of inputs to a channel; and OUT,
of outputs. Then I(IN;OUT) is the expected amount of information that can be obtained
about the inputs by observing the outputs.
Finally, an extension to mutual information will turn out to be useful. Sometimes auxil-
iary knowledge about channels is available—for example, a channel might be known to be
noisier during daytime than during night. Conditional mutual information can model such
knowledge. The conditional mutual information I(x;y jz)—note that comma binds tighter
than bar in this notation—between events x and y given the occurrence of auxiliary event z
is deﬁned like I(x;y), but with all probabilities conditioned on z:
I(x;y jz) ,  log
Pr(xjz)Pr(yjz)
Pr(x;y jz)
: (B.7)
And conditional mutual information I(X;Y jZ) between distributions X and Y , given
distribution Z, is again an expectation:
I(X;Y jZ) , E[I(X;Y jZ)] (B.8)
=  
X
x;y;z
Pr(x;y;z)log
Pr(xjz)Pr(yjz)
Pr(x;y jz)
:
The Shannon entropy (or simply entropy) H(X) of a distribution X is the expected
36self-information31 conveyed by the events of X:
H(X) , E[I(X)] (B.9)
=  
X
x2X
Pr(x)logPr(x):
Entropy is always at least 0 and is maximized by uniform distributions. For example, the
entropy of the uniform distribution of a space of 232 events is 32 bits—the same number of
bits as required to store a 32-bit integer.
The joint entropy H(X;Y ) of two distributions X and Y is the expected amount of
information conveyed by the occurrence of an event from their joint distribution:
H(X;Y ) =  
X
x2X;y2Y
Pr(x;y)logPr(x;y):
If X and Y are independent, joint entropy H(X;Y ) is simply H(X) + H(Y ). If they are
instead dependent, observing one might yield information about the other. The conditional
entropy H(XjY ) is the expected amount of information conveyed by the occurrence of an
event from X given knowledge of what event from Y has occurred:
H(XjY ) ,  
X
x2X;y2Y
Pr(x;y)logPr(xjy): (B.10)
An equivalent formulation of conditional entropy can be obtained by conditioning ﬁrst on a
single event, then taking an expectation over all events:
H(Xjy) =  
X
x2X
Pr(xjy)logPr(xjy);
H(XjY ) = Ey2Y [H(Xjy)]: (B.11)
The joint entropy of X and Y can also be expressed as the amount of information obtained
by observing X, then observing Y given knowledge of X; or vice versa:
H(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y jX) = H(Y ) + H(XjY ):
Mutual information is related to entropy:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)   H(XjY ) = H(Y )   H(Y jX): (B.12)
H(X) is how much (expected) information could be obtained about X, and H(XjY ) is the
amount remaining to obtain after observing Y . The difference between these two quantities
is the amount obtained about X by observing Y .
31For consistency, a better notation for the entropy of X might be I(X)—cf. deﬁnition (B.6), where
E[I(X;Y )] is equated with I(X;Y ). But H(X) is the traditional notation for entropy.
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